I generally tend not to reproduce other people's writing on this blog, but Juraj Katalenac's essay at the Adidas Marxism site (here) provides quite a useful summary of some problems with contemporary 'American' leftist theory. While none of these points is original, Katalenac points to: the conservatism of concepts such as 'cultural appropriation'; the limited applicability of US-centric notions of race to other national contexts; and the tendency to regard the working class as an identity - one which enjoys a particular moral status as the 'salt of the earth' (i.e. what Gáspár Tamás calls the Rousseauian view of the working class).
John Molyneux, Will the revolution be televised?: A Marxist analysis of the media. London: Bookmarks Publications, 2011.
John Molyneux's pocket-sized book provides an accessible and enjoyable analysis of the news and entertainment media. Molyneux shows how a variety of British media formats and genres reflect and reinforce ruling class ideologies, concentrating mainly on television programmes with large audiences. Particularly fine is Molyneux's succinct but devastating critique of the British soap opera EastEnders (now there's a phrase I never thought I'd write!), which points to the drama's virtual absence of working class characters (most of the main characters are small business owners), its under-representation of racial minority groups, and the striking and wholly unrealistic absence of political or class consciousness among the good folk of Albert Square.
Happily, Molyneux - a Trotskyist and a member of the Socialist Workers Party - eschews many of the voguish assumptions of liberal media criticism. Mainstream media organisations should be criticised, Molyneux argues, not for being biased towards the right (which, as Molyneux correctly argues, they are not), but for their promotion of capitalist ideology. This point may seem familiar, or even obvious, but it is an important one to make when so many on the left today restrict their criticisms to 'neoliberal' capitalism (as though capitalism would be acceptable and/or workable with just a little more direction from a benevolent, 'democratic' state).
I would, nevertheless, take issue with one or two of Molyneux's arguments. My principal criticism relates to Molyneux's reading of the News of the World phone hacking scandal, the exposure of which Molyneux takes as evidence that powerful media institutions can be challenged and brought low. This point is fine as far as it goes; but it ignores the political context of the scandal, which was in essence an epiphenomenal manifestation of the ongoing struggle between pro-US and pro-independence factions of the British state (the International Communist Current's article on the scandal remains, to my knowledge, the only article that shows any real understanding of this political context). In view of this, the takedown of Murdoch is best seen not as an assertion of people power, but as a sign of the British state's increasing intolerance of News International's propaganda. Appalling as the activities of the News of the World phone hackers were - and welcome as their exposure was - it is not clear to me why the humbling of one powerful set of politico-ideological interests by the even more powerful forces of the British state and the liberal media should be celebrated as a democratic gain.
I suspect that Molyneux's relatively optimistic reading of Hackgate is informed by the typically left-liberal assumption that the US-supporting media, such as those owned by News International, necessarily constitute a greater ideological menace than the liberal media and public service broadcasters such as the BBC. Even during the Blair years, when British foreign policy tended to follow that of the US, this was questionable (of all the news organisations, the BBC, according to a Cardiff University study, provided the least critical news coverage of the invasion of Iraq). Today, as tensions between Britain and the US grow, and as Britain pursues a more independent foreign policy, I think that it is even less plausible. Indeed, as I have suggested in a recent polemic, the BBC is as clearly an organ of state propaganda as any commercial media institution, despite - or more probably because of - its long-standing reputation for independence, neutrality and objectivity.
But this is a minor quibble. Molyneux's short text offers a convincing, concise and inexpensive introduction to the Marxist critique of the media. I strongly recommend it to anybody seeking to understand the ideological functions of the contemporary mainstream media.
Terry Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. 258pp. 9780300169430
Paul Mattick, Business As Usual: The Economic Crisis and the Failure of Capitalism. London: Reaktion Books, 2011. 126pp. 9781861898012
In 2008, as journalists and pundits struggled to account for the return of a crisis that was not – following political promises of ‘the end of boom and bust’ – supposed to reoccur, copies of Capital and The Communist Manifesto reportedly flew off bookshop shelves. Even some mainstream media commentators began to wonder if Marx might have been right all along. But such doubts – coming from commentators not accustomed to harbouring them – were often as ephemeral as they were grudging, and lay readers seeking robust but accessible understandings of Marxist thought have been ill-served in recent years. This year, however, saw the publication of two highly accessible books – written by, respectively, a veteran Marxist literary critic and one of the US’s most clear-sighted Marxist polymaths – which argue for the continuing and deepening relevance of Marx’s ideas for our times.
Why Marx Was Right is a myth-busting text. With characteristic erudition, wit and verve, Eagleton addresses the commonplace charges that Marxism represents a utopian, soulless, outdated, unduly statist, unnecessarily violent or economically determinist school of thought. Eagleton gamely takes on and demolishes these criticisms one by one, showing Marx to be a flexible, pragmatic and undogmatic thinker and arguing for the eminently human – even humanist – character of Marx’s political outlook. Importantly, too, he distances Marxism from the terrorisitic regimes of the twentieth century that claimed to operate in its name. Maoism and Stalinism, he notes, were ‘botched, bloody experiments which made the very idea of socialism stink in the nostrils of those elsewhere in the world who had most to benefit from it’ (p.15).
The criticisms of Marxism addressed in the book are the ones typically levelled by Marx’s right-wing critics (while they are not mentioned by name, the latter would surely include philosophical anti-Marxists such as John Gray) – and rightly so, since these are the criticisms that Eagleton’s intended audience of lay readers is most likely to have encountered. Those seeking some discussion of the more sophisticated interventions into Marxist theory made by anarchists, autonomists and left communists, however, will be disappointed. Indeed, while it would be impossible for a short polemic such as Eagleton’s to deal even cursorily with every political school of thought influenced by Marxism, the version of Marxism defended here is broadly Trotskyist and other Marxist traditions are given somewhat short shrift. Eagleton dismisses as ‘ultra left’, for example, those Marxists who ‘look to revolution rather than to parliamentary democracy and social reform’ (p.190) and the point is followed by a joking footnote which mocks the supposed absurdity of left-communist positions: ‘In the militant 1970s, [...] the true purists or ultraleftists [...] were those who were able to return an unequivocal No to the question ‘Would you call the bourgeois fire brigade’, (p.247). This dismissiveness towards ultra left positions is unfortunate, since elsewhere in the book Eagleton is at pains to emphasize that matters to which he devotes extended discussion – such as the desirability of ‘market socialism’ – have been the subject of vigorous debate among Marxists of various persuasions. It is also indicative of Eagleton’s tendency to emphasize the humanistic and reformist, rather than the revolutionary aspects of Marx’s thought.
Indeed, while Eagleton is certainly not neglectful of history – he notes, for example, that the composition of the working class has changed significantly since Marx’s time – he does tend to present the reformism of nineteenth-century socialism as more or less adequate in the current era. But capitalism today is not the same as that which confronted workers in Marx’s time. The nineteenth century, for all its horrors, was a period of rising wages and capitalist expansion, in which unions served as more or less effective organs of reform. The revolutionary wave of the early twentieth century, by contrast, indicated that the communist transformation of society was possible. The state, meanwhile, has grown enormously in size and scope since that period, absorbing the unions, which have in turn played a mostly reactionary role by supporting the world wars and dividing struggling workers by nation, sector and job role – however militant their rank and file members may be. However one describes such historical shifts (as a movement from formal to real subsumption, from ascendance to decadence, etc.), their political ramifications cannot be ignored. The qualitative differences between the capitalism of Marx’s day and ours have changed the rules of the game, placing revolution, rather than mere reform, on the political agenda and transforming the nature of working class organs of struggle. Admittedly, it is difficult to take full account of a century and a half of capitalist development in a short polemic such as Eagleton’s; nevertheless, Why Marx Was Right does rather under-estimate the dramatic shift in the nature of capitalism since the beginning of the twentieth century and its implications for proletarian political strategy.
On a more prosaic level, some readers may find the relentlessly puckish literary style of Why Marx Was Right irritating. Eagleton, as always, is drole; but the Eagletonian trope of illustrating abstract concepts with vividly concrete images and eccentric analogies – to which the author gives full rein – is often more grating than illuminating. ‘To judge socialism by its results in one desperately isolated country’, he writes of the Soviet Union under Stalin, ‘would be like drawing conclusions about the human race from a study of psychopaths in Kalamazoo’ (p.17). To call such writing over-wrought would be an understatement. Despite these reservations, however, Why Marx Was Right provides lively defence of Marxism that will prove particularly useful to those encountering Marx's ideas for the first time, providing reassurance that Marx did not hold all, or even any, of the views attributed to him by his detractors.
Since Eagleton is more concerned with defending Marxism from attack than advocating it as a means of critique, a better – albeit less stirring – title for his book might be Why Marx Wasn’t Wrong. Eagleton’s actual title, in fact, rather better describes the stance of Paul Mattick Junior’s Business As Usual. At just 126 pages including footnotes, Mattick’s book offers a Marxist explanation of capitalist crisis for a lay readership in a highly condensed format. Beginning with an analysis of thelongue durée of capitalist business cycles, Mattick shows, in characteristically precise and jargon-free prose, how Marxian economic theory offers resources for explaining the latest crisis of the system in its historical context. Mattick is well-qualified for this task: just as his father, the council communist Paul Mattick Senior, had used Marxian economics to predict the ultimate failure of post-war welfare Keynsianism in his 1962 book Marx and Keynes, Mattick’s Marxist method has enabled him correctly to predict the ways in which the economic crisis would unfold since 2007. As Mattick stresses, such predictional accuracy is not a matter of intelligence or insight, but is rather ‘a matter of knowing how to think about what is going on’ (p.9). Indeed, continuing the theme of one of Mattick’s earlier books, Social Knowledge, Marxism is posited here as the best guide to acquiring knowledge in the social sciences and one of this book’s clearest messages – recalling his father’s argument in Marx and Keynes – has to do with the bankruptcy of mainstream economic analysis.
In the first part of the book, Mattick addresses some common misconceptions, arguing that economic crises are not, as is often claimed, caused by ‘exogenous shocks’ to the system, but are internal to the dynamics of capitalism. But the central problem with mainstream accounts of the recent crisis, Mattick argues, lies in their mistaken assumption that the point of capitalism is to create goods in order to satisfy consumer demand; Mattick argues that capitalists aim rather to create profit. Thus, in response to Keynesian commentators such as Paul Krugman, whose recommendations for beating the recession include massive stimulus spending and job creation schemes, Mattick bluntly points out that ‘capitalism is a system not for providing “employment” as an abstract goal, but for employing people who produce profits’ (p.79). And therein lies the problem. Following the work of Robert Brenner, Mattick points to the more or less steady decline since the mid-1970s in levels of capital investment and profitability – a decline that would have led to a crisis much earlier had its effects not been staved off by enormous levels of private, public and government debt.
While emphasizing the cyclical nature of economic downturn, Mattick notes that the present crisis is unfolding in a radically different context to that of earlier depressions. The state-capitalist solution of large-scale government spending that was implemented by leaders from Roosevelt to Hitler in response to the depression of the 1930s is virtually impossible to implement today (and in any case, as Mattick points out, it was actually the second world war, not these Keyenesian measures, that finally enabled capitalism to climb out of depression). Keynesians, argues Mattick, have never faced up to the long-term consequences of government borrowing, which has now spiralled out of control – in the US it has risen from $16 billion in 1930 to $12.5 trillion today – raising the prospect of default for many countries. Governments are therefore caught between the rock of allowing the crisis to ‘play out’, imposing austerity and trying to contain the ensuing social unrest and the hard place of stimulus spending, which will lead to disastrously high levels of government debt.
An additional problem, Mattick notes, is that capitalism today is integrated as never before in its history, so that any solutions that capitalism invents to remedy its own problems must be international in nature (p.101) – a virtual impossibility in a world of competing nation states. World war has, of course, traditionally offered one such global solution for capitalism; but as Mattick notes, although the world today is wracked by war, mobilising an (as yet) undefeated working class for a world war would prove difficult for the ruling class (although, in a world full of nuclear weapons, one wonders if troop mobilisation would even be necessary). Moreover, even if the economy does temporarily recover, this will only exascerbate the environmental destruction and depletion of natural resources that already threaten to render the planet uninhabitable for human life.
In the book’s final pages, Mattick is upbeat about the decline of the ‘traditional’ left of ‘parties, unions and radical sects’ (p.109), arguing that the solution to the social problems created by capitalism will have to come through the activity and invention of ordinary people. This might begin with people simply taking and using housing, food and other goods, organising production and distribution to meet their own needs (pp.106-7). In this, Mattick sounds a refreshingly pragmatic and undogmatic note and, unlike Eagleton, shows an awareness that organs such as the unions no longer serve the progressive function they once did. Inevitably, however, some Marxists will feel that Mattick, by seeming to present the overcoming of capitalist social relations as a process of communisation that bypasses the need for proletarian dictatorship, underestimates the importance of working-class political organisation to any post-capitalist transition.
Some will say, too, that Mattick’s account of economic crisis over-emphasizes the causal importance of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. There is a significant divergence, for example, between Mattick’s focus on profit rate and the more pluralist account of capitalist crisis given in David Harvey’s The Enigma of Capital (another of the rather few accessible Marxist books about the crisis to have appeared of late). Those interested in Mattick’s critique of Harvey’s position will, however, need to look elsewhere for illumination, since Mattick focuses here primarily on his own thesis, rather than engaging in lengthy dialogues with the arguments of others. But whatever view one takes of the role of profit rates in capitalist crisis, Mattick’s book valuably locates the roots of the crisis in the nature of the capitalist system, providing a forceful counterargument to those liberal-left moralists who have sought to blame the recent crisis on ‘greedy bankers’, ‘neoliberalism’ or other manifestations of ‘excessive’ capitalism, while arguing for a return to a regulated Keynesianism. Like his father before him, Mattick argues convincingly that neither the ‘free market’ nor the Keynesian policies of the ruling class offers a way to overcome the cycle of boom and bust in an increasingly beleaguered system. Indeed, both Eagleton’s and Mattick’s books serve as accessible reminders that, as Sartre observed half a century ago in Search for a Method, we cannot ‘go beyond’ Marxism until we have transcended the circumstances which engendered it.